Conversations – Performing Credit Quarterly 1Q2023
发布时间 2023-04-20 14:16:27 来源
Hello and welcome to the first episode of the Insight by Oak Tree Capital. This new podcast will feature audio versions of Insights publications as well as interviews with Oak Tree Thought Leaders. Today I'm pleased to be joined by Armin Pinotian, Oak Tree's head of performing credit, and Oak Tree's co-chairman Howard Marx. We'll be discussing topics related to Oak Tree's recently published performing credit quarterly and Howard's latest memo, Lessons from Silicon Valley Bank.
大家好，欢迎来到橡树资本的“洞见”第一集。这是一档兼备Insights刊物和橡树资本权威人士采访的播客节目。今天我很高兴有Armin Pinotian先生，橡树资本的履行信用负责人，和橡树资本联席主席Howard Marx先生加入我们，我们将会讨论与橡树资本最近发布的履行信用季刊和Howard的最新备忘录“从硅谷银行汲取的教训”相关的主题。
Thank you both for joining me today.
感谢你们今天加入我的行列。
It's a pleasure to be with you, Anna.
和你在一起很愉快，安娜。
Thank you.
谢谢您。
So we will dive right in and Armin, I'm going to start with you. In the latest edition of the performing credit quarterly, you and your co-author note that the problems we saw emerge in the first quarter are examples of the type of stress that can erupt after a long period of easy money comes to an abrupt end. Can you speak a little bit more about this?
所以，我们将直接开始，阿明，我要先从你开始说起。在最新版的绩效信用季报中，你和你的合著者指出，我们在第一季度看到的问题是一种长期易货币的突然终止所引起的压力的例子。你能再多讲一些吗？
Sure, thanks Anna. As the markets have been pretty wide open following the global financial crisis and up to the pandemic period, a lot of capital structures were put in place that had sizable debt balances on them, including in the real estate asset class. When lending practices are wide open when the cost of borrowing is quite low, what you find is that structures are put in place that at higher loaned of values, at higher multiples on leverage, higher prices being paid for assets or businesses, then what is historically normal? And those structures are predicated on those low cost of borrowing to be persistent and durable for a very long period of time. So what we're finding is upside down capital structures today that were put in place several years ago when it was just easier to borrow and easier to transact in businesses both on the buy side and the sell side. I think in addition to that, the last thing I would say is as capital flowed into these lending asset classes, whether they be direct lending or broadly syndicated loans, there was an erosion in the legal protections as well for what was historically an asset class that had very strong legal protections in the form of covenants that were tested quarterly that ensured that a company was healthy and that lenders and other investors were getting appropriately compensated for the risk that they took on.
当市场在全球金融危机期间及疫情期间相当开放时，许多资本结构被建立起来，其中包含了较大的债务余额，包括房地产资产类别。当借贷实践很宽松时，借贷成本非常低，你会发现，在更高的贷款价值、更高的杠杆倍数和更高的资产或企业价格上建立的结构，要比历史上的正常情况更高。这些结构是基于这些借贷成本持久和持久的假设之上的。因此，我们今天发现的资本结构是颠倒的，这些结构是在几年前建立的，当时借贷和交易业务对购买方和销售方来说都更容易。除此之外，我认为最后一点是，随着资本流入这些借贷资产类别，无论是直接借贷还是广泛的银团贷款，法律保护也会被侵蚀，这在历史上曾经是一个具有非常强的法律保障的资产类别，其中包括每季度测试的契约，以确保公司健康运营，并确保借款人和其他投资者得到适当的风险补偿。
I'm going to answer the same question in a couple of different ways, but leading to the same message and the same conclusions as Armin just expressed. And the key is the old saying that the worst of loans are made in the best of times. In good times, people feel optimistic about the future. They feel there's nothing to worry about. Their biggest concern is often phomo, the concern that they'll miss the deal. So they're not afraid of losing money. They're not afraid of making an unwise deal. They're afraid that somebody else will get the deal. So they bid aggressively. And how do you bid when you want to get a deal as a lender? You offer to take less return and less safety. Of course, those are not generally wise things to do. And if you do those things in the good times and the bad times roll around, they can really buy you. Back in February, 2007, I wrote a memo called the Race to the Bottom. And I talked about what happens when there's too much money in people's hands and they've been to aggressively for assets. And it's a very negative impact.
我将用几种不同的方式来回答同一个问题，但是它们都反映出与Armin所表达的相同信息和结论。关键是古语所说的，“好时候，坏贷款” 的问题。在好时候，人们对未来持乐观态度。他们觉得没有什么需要担心的。他们最担心的通常是 FOMO，即担心错过交易机会。因此，他们不怕亏钱，也不怕做出不明智的交易。他们害怕别人抢先抢走了这个交易机会。所以他们会进行激烈竞标。当你作为贷方想获得一笔生意时，你会怎样竞标呢？你会提供更少的回报和更少的保障。当然，这些通常都不是明智的做法。如果你在好时候这样做，在坏时候到来时，可能会给你带来真正的问题。2007年2月，我写了一篇名为 “向底部竞速”的备忘录。我谈到了当人们手里有太多的钱，并过于激进地投资资产时会发生什么事情。这会带来非常消极的影响。
As described in my December memo, C-Change, from the beginning of 09 through the end of 21, we went through an easy money period. It had a lot of attributes, but I think they're summed up by the term easy money. And it was a period in which we had the longest economic recovery in history. We had the longest bull market in the S&P 500 in history. And of course, people reached that optimistic stage where they did the things that Armin describes. They weakened the covenants and they permitted higher debt equity ratios. They accepted low interest rates. The sum of which we think sets the stage for some very interesting developments in the near future. And by the way, I think that the, so I say, retreat from the conditions of those years is not over. It's one of the premises of C-Change that it's not going to reverse anytime soon.
按照我在十二月备忘录中所描述的，从09年开始到21年结束，我们经历了一个容易获得资金的时期。它有很多特点，但我认为它们被“容易获得资金”这个术语所概括。这是一个我们经历史上最长的经济复苏期和S&P500最长的牛市。当然，人们也达到了乐观的阶段，他们放宽了契约并允许更高的负债权益比率。他们接受了低利率。这些综合起来，我们认为为不久的未来铺平了一条非常有趣的道路。顺便说一句，我认为这种逃离那些年的条件并没有结束。这是C-Change的前提之一，它不会很快反转。
How is some of what you're talking about here potentially related to some of the issues we saw in the banking sector in the first quarter and that Howard, that you discuss in your recent memo?
你在这里谈论的一些内容是否与我们在第一季度银行业中看到的一些问题有关，这也是霍华德在他最近的备忘录中所讨论的问题之一吗？
In a lot of articles about Silicon Valley Bank, you'll read the phrase that the easy money environment of the last several years created conditions at S&P that led to its demise. And the best thing that people can do to understand the workings of the cycle, be it economic, regulatory, banking, market is to understand co-zalley and to understand that an easy money environment like SVB faced and like Silicon Valley as a whole faced leads to practices which are dangerous or conditions that are dangerous.
在许多关于硅谷银行的文章中，你会读到这样一个短语：过去几年的宽松货币环境导致了S&P的灭亡。人们最好的理解周期的方式，无论是经济、监管、银行、市场，就是了解集体马厩，并且理解像硅谷银行和整个硅谷一样的宽松货币环境会导致危险的做法或危险的情况。
In SVB case, interestingly, what happened was that the venture capital companies or the tech companies were so awash with money that it piled up in SVB, they put it on deposit. Most of them didn't need loans, so the money stayed there, it wasn't recycled deposits from some people into loans to others, it stayed there. So they turned around and they invested it in the bond market. They bought treasuries and agency mortgages, not the worst thing in the world. But you know what? What they missed was the fact that they bought long bonds at the lowest yields in history. And when interest rates were raised by the Fed to fight inflation, the long bond loses the most value the fastest.
在SVB案中，有趣的是，风险投资公司或科技公司赚了很多钱，因此资金积聚在SVB，他们把它存放在那里。大多数公司不需要贷款，所以资金一直留在那里，没有像有些人的存款被用于贷款给别人。因此，他们转而在债券市场上进行投资。他们购买了国债和机构抵押贷款，这不是世界上最糟糕的事情。但是，他们忽视了一个事实，他们购买了历史上收益率最低的长期债券。当联邦储备银行为抑制通胀而提高利率时，长期债券最快贬值。
These securities ended up underwater. With rolls required the bank to sell them in order to pay people out. They had to realize those losses. The losses were noticed by other people who then made withdrawals, who then required more sales by the bank. They got into a downward spiral that they couldn't escape from.
这些证券最终出现了亏损。银行需要进行平仓交易以支付客户。他们不得不承认这些损失。其他人注意到这些损失并进行了提现，这进一步要求银行进行更多的出售。他们陷入了一个无法逃脱的恶性循环。
It all starts with the easy money environment or let's just say the easy environment. And sometimes things in the business world are easy. Sometimes they're hard. The key to what Armin said before and what I'm trying to say is that when things are easy, Fed practices are engaged in. If you engage in Fed practices in the good times, you're unlikely to get through the bad times on Skaith. An Anna on a case of Silicon Valley Bank.
一切都始于轻松的经济环境，或者说轻松的环境。有时，商业世界中的事情很容易，有时则很困难。阿尔明之前所说的和我试图表达的关键是，在事情变得容易的时候，要实行美联储的政策。如果你在好时期实行美联储的实践，那么在困难时期就很难度过。这是来自硅谷银行的安娜的案例。
It's a variation of a theme we actually saw during the global financial crisis, which was mismatched assets and liabilities. You sort of forget that you're supposed to match your assets and your liabilities when times are good, when everything is benign, everything is pointing to the right and up.
这是我们在全球金融危机期间实际看到的主题变化，即资产和负债不匹配。当景气良好、一切都十分平稳、向正确和向上的方向发展时，你会忘记你本应该在匹配你的资产和负债。
But in the case of Silicon Valley Bank, one would argue that they didn't have excessive risk in their loan book, but they did have a mismatch in assets and liabilities in that their deposits were very, very short-term liabilities and their assets were fixed rate, very, very long-term assets that took a huge market market loss that ordinarily would be okay, but because they're just market market and not realized, but because the liabilities created a liquidity crunch. The liquidity crunch created a solvency issue for the bank at exactly the wrong time.
但就硅谷银行而言，人们可以争论说他们的贷款组合风险并不过高，但他们的资产和负债存在不匹配，即他们的存款是非常短期的负债，而他们的资产是固定利率、非常长期的资产，导致遭受了巨大的市场损失。这通常是可以接受的，因为它们只是市场损失而不是实现的损失，但由于负债创建了流动性危机，流动性危机在恰恰错误的时间为银行带来了偿付能力问题。
We saw that in the global financial crisis, obviously worse in the global financial crisis because that asset liability mismatch, it also came with very risky lending practices on top of it. But it's a reminder, the Silicon Valley Bank situation is a reminder that there are shocks still possible. Nobody could predict what happened to Silicon Valley Bank, but it did. And a $220 billion bank went down in three days.
在全球金融危机中，我们看到了由于资产负债不匹配，加上高风险的贷款方式，导致了显然更糟糕的全球金融危机。但这也提醒我们，硅谷银行的情况提醒我们，仍然可能发生冲击。没有人能预测硅谷银行发生了什么，但它确实发生了。一个价值2200亿美元的银行在三天内破产了。
The other thing I would point out about Silicon Valley Bank, which is noteworthy and important. The speed at which markets move is much faster today than 10, 15 years ago.
关于硅谷银行，我想指出另一个值得注意和重要的事情。市场的运动速度比10年或15年前要快得多。
Today if you had an account with Silicon Valley Bank and you heard, you know, there's going to be a write down and the equity book value is going to be written down. Oh my gosh, I'm going to take out all of my deposits. If I do have an undrawn revolver, I'm going to draw it at Silicon Valley Bank. Well, you could now do that on your phone in a minute. You don't need to go into a branch, you don't need to go through the complicated paperwork of transferring your capital into another bank or another institution. You could just click the button.
如果你拥有硅谷银行的账户，而听说了会有资产减值和股本价值将被写下的消息，那么你可能会想要把所有的存款取出来。如果你有未使用的授信额度，也许会在硅谷银行取出来。现在你可以通过手机在一分钟内完成这些操作，不需要去支行，也不需要经历转移资产到另一家银行或机构的繁琐文件工作。你只需要点一下按钮就行了。
So the combination of social media plus the velocity at which you could make things happen with money today caused a really acute problem in this mismatched asset liability mix at Silicon Valley Bank. I apologize for belaboring the point, but Armin and I love to knock this subject around.
因此，社交媒体与现今金钱快速运作速度的结合在硅谷银行引起了这种不匹配的资产负债混合所造成的非常严重的问题。我很抱歉一再强调这个问题，但Armin和我喜欢一起讨论这个主题。
Mark Twain said a lot of brilliant things, one of which was that history does not repeat, but it does rhyme. In other words, the details are always different, but there are certain underlying themes that we see over and over again. When you see meltdowns in periods of difficulty, the two outstanding reasons are number one, the mismatch that Armin just talked about, having long term illiquid assets that it's hard to get out of and short term liabilities that can demand payment in short order.
马克·吐温说过很多聪明的话，其中之一是：历史不会重复，但它会押韵。换句话说，细节总是不同的，但我们总是看到某些潜在的主题一次又一次地出现。在困难时期出现崩盘的两个显著原因是：第一，阿明刚刚谈到的不匹配，即持有长期的不易变现的资产，而面临着可以短时间内要求付款的短期负债。
The other one is a high degree of leverage and having a very high ratio of assets to equity capital and not much equity and SBB headboth. It shouldn't be surprising that they couldn't survive a period of difficulty, especially in the hyperactive climate that Armin described thanks to social media.
另一个问题是高度杠杆化，资产与股本的比例非常高，并且没有太多股本和SBB头寸。这并不令人惊讶，特别是在像Armin所描述的社交媒体高活跃气候中，他们无法熬过困难时期。
As we look forward, what do you think will be some of the implications of the banking stress that we saw in the first quarter? Well, I'm happy to start and I'm sure Howard has more eloquent way of describing things, but I think there's a few things.
当我们展望未来时，你认为我们在第一季度看到的银行压力会有哪些影响？嗯，我很高兴先开始谈一下，我相信霍华德有更雄辩的描述方式，但我认为有几个方面需要注意。
Explanation:
当我们展望未来时，我们需要考虑银行在第一季度所承受的压力将会带来哪些影响。谈到这个话题，第一个发言者表示自己很高兴先发表一些看法，并预测银行压力将会产生几个方面的影响。同时，他也预感到自己的表述可能不够精彩，还有另外一位发言者能够更好地表述这个话题。
First of all, with the Silicon Valley Bank meltdown, as well as the losses incurred on banks' balance sheets from the syndication process in 2022, essentially the hung loan problem. It's a reminder that banks could actually lose money in processes where they were just trying to earn a moving fee.
首先，随着硅谷银行的崩溃以及2022年银行在联合贷款过程中的损失，实质上是悬挂贷款问题，这提醒我们银行在试图赚取佣金的过程中实际上也可能亏损。
They were originating assets and moving them to a set of investors and thinking that it was free money and they lost $3-4 billion last year. I think that issue that reminder will cause further regulatory oversight, which really started during the global financial crisis with Dodd-Frank and is really not let up in Europe, the Basel III regulations.
他们起初将资产源头放在一组投资者那里，并认为那是免费的金钱，但去年他们损失了30-40亿美元。我认为此事将导致更多的监管监督，这在全球金融危机期间由多德-弗兰克法案开始实施，而在欧洲和巴塞尔III规定方面仍在继续。
I think we should expect to see more, not less, oversight of the way banks use their balance sheets are in fees. As a result, I think a lot of what banks used to do is now moving into more of a shadow banking market, into a direct lending market, where institutional investors and managers are picking up the slack and taking on the opportunity to invest with companies as long as they are appropriately structured.
我认为我们应该预计看到更多而不是更少的监督，来监管银行使用其资产负债表中的费用。因此，我认为许多银行过去所做的事情现在正在转向更多的影子银行市场，进入直接融资市场，其中机构投资者和经理们正在接手这个机会，只要它们被适当地结构化，则可以与公司投资。
A large market is emerging where the banks are shrinking. That's the opportunity that I see right now in terms of changes. The only change is increase regulation. It's a different mood. It's a different mindset.
在银行缩减的情况下，出现了一个巨大的市场。这就是我目前看到的变化带来的机遇。唯一的变化是加强监管。这是一种不同的情绪和思维方式。
Let's go back to what I said before. The worst of loans are made in the best of times. When people feel expansive, they do things that they probably shouldn't have done. When times are less good, you can't do the same things because they're psyche and other things, I don't permit it.
让我们回到我之前所说的话。最糟糕的贷款往往是在最好的时候发生的。当人们感到扩张时，他们会做一些可能不应该做的事情。当时期不那么好时，你不能做同样的事情，因为它们的心理和其他方面不允许。
The way I have been synthesizing this in the current episode is that when we're in the easy money environment, and everybody was happy, and optimism was riding high, you go into a bank, you have a project, you explain it, they said, okay, we'll lend you 800 million at 5%. Things get a little tougher. Some negatives come up.
我在目前这一集中的综合理解是，当我们处于肆意挥霍的环境中，每个人都很幸福，乐观情绪高涨，你进入银行，有一个项目，解释一下，他们说，“好的，我们将以5%的利率借给您8亿。”事情变得有些困难了。一些负面情况出现了。
Now people are not uniformly optimistic. Some worry creeps in. You go into refinance that loan. They say, okay, great. We'll lend you 500 million at 8%. Where are you going to get the 800 million that you have to pay off? Oh, for that, you have to pay a lot more, or you can't get it, and you default.
现在人们并不全都对未来持乐观态度，一些担忧开始蔓延。如果你要去重新贷款，他们会说“好的，我们可以以8%的利率借给你5亿。但是你需要支付的8亿在哪里找？你要支付更多的利息，否则你无法得到贷款，甚至还有可能违约。”
So easy money sets a stage for bad outcomes. And a need for incremental equity. The new deal under the current market dynamics, current market rates requires a 60% equity check, whether it's a real estate asset or a corporate asset.
轻松的赚钱会导致不好的结果。而需要逐步增加股权。在当前市场动态和利率的情况下，新交易需要进行60%的股权核查，无论是房地产资产还是公司资产。
And if you have a deal that's four years old, where there's only a 40% equity check with meaningfully lower base rates, and you have a maturity. If you have a problem in the portfolio, if you have a cash flow issue, in the case of real estate, a tenant vacating or in the case of corporate inflation, which we have now seen following COVID, well, where's that equity going to come from?
如果你有一份4年前签订的合约，只有40%的股权检查和显著降低的基本利率，并且你有一个到期日。如果你的投资组合中出现问题，例如现金流问题，在房地产方面，租户搬离，或者企业通货膨胀，就像我们现在在COVID后看到的那样，那么这笔资本从哪里来呢？
Not everybody has reserved that kind of equity because it would have impacted their returns. So therein lies, I think, a distressed opportunity, which appears to be unfolding before us. I think the ingredients are there for a very large, multi-asset, multinational, global, distressed episode here.
并不是每个人都拥有那种股权，因为它会对他们的回报产生影响。因此，我认为这里存在一个困境的机会，似乎正在展开。我觉得在这里有许多元素可以导致一个非常大的、多种资产、跨国的、全球性的困境事件。
So Anna, what are the questions? People say, will it happen? We believe it has started. How long will it go on? We have no way to ignore it. The only question is, what's taking place today? And what we think is taking place is the opposite of easy money. Harder to get, operating conditions more difficult, cost of money higher.
安娜，有什么问题呢？人们说，这会发生吗？我们相信已经开始了。它会持续多久？我们不能置之不理。唯一的问题是，今天发生了什么？我们认为正在发生的事情正好相反于容易的钱。变得更加艰难，经营条件更加困难，资金成本更高。
All these things should be transferring the cards from the hand of the borrower to the hand of the lender, in which we can do the opposite of the race to the bottom. We can demand higher returns with more safety. So that ties into one of the key takeaways from the performing credit quarterly, which is related to opportunities we're seeing in private credit.
所有这些事情都应该是将借款人的卡片转到借方手中，这样我们就可以做与底线竞争相反的事情。我们可以要求更高的回报和更高的安全性。这与我们在表现信贷季度报告中看到的私人信贷的机会息息相关，是其中的一个重要收获之一。
So Armin, I wanted you to speak a bit about, you touched on it earlier, how banks have been curtailing their lending, especially related to large-scale leverage buyouts. Could you explain why this has been happening and the implications for private credit?
所以，Armin，我希望你能稍微谈谈银行如何削减他们的贷款，尤其是与大规模杠杆收购有关的贷款。你能解释为什么会发生这种情况以及对私人信用的影响吗？
Sure. When banks syndicate a loan, or when they make a commitment to a borrower to fund a loan to them. They take on some market risk. They open their commitment for six to 12 months, while the borrower goes through its regulatory and other hurdles that it needs to jump through.
当银行联合融资或向借款人作出贷款承诺时，他们承担一定的市场风险。他们会向借款人开放约六至十二个月的承诺期，在此期间借款人需通过其所需跨越的监管和其他障碍。
And during that period of time, it takes market risk on the rates rising or something else happening, but the prevailing market conditions. And that's what happened in 2022.
在这段时间内，市场风险承担着利率上升或发生其他事件的风险，但是要考虑当前的市场情况。这就是2022年发生的事情。
In early 2022, banks were on the hook for $60 billion of syndicated lending. As the rate picture changed materially in such a short time frame in 2022, they found that the uptake of those loans that were already committed to was weaker.
在2022年初，银行需要承担600亿美元的联合贷款责任。由于2022年短时间内利率情况发生了实质性变化，他们发现已经承诺的这些贷款的吸收情况较弱。
The uptake being from funds like ETFs or mutual funds or from CLOs, collateralized loan obligations. Because 2022 was a very down year in terms of CLO formation. And it also coincided in a period of time where retail funds were outflowing.
这种购买来自于像ETF或共同基金或抵押贷款义务证券（CLO）等基金的资金。原因是2022年是CLO成立非常低迷的一年，并且恰好在零售基金流出期间发生。
Now, CLO formation continues to be sporadic this year. ETFs have only been outflowing in a pretty material way this year. So if you're a bank and you have a limited balance sheet, and if you've taken on or if you experienced such material losses in 2022, what do you do with your remaining balance sheet given the unstable backdrop of fund flows for the buyer universe of the loans that you syndicate?
目前，CLO的形成今年仍然不稳定。ETF今年一直以相当大的流出方式流出。所以，如果你是一家银行，且你的资产负债表有限，或者你在2022年承担了如此大的损失，那么考虑到贷款的买家组织的基金流动不稳定的背景，你会怎样处理你剩余的资产负债表？
What you do is you just commit less. You either don't commit at all or you very, very sporadically commit in smaller size of capital that you feel very confident that you could place successfully into the market and not blow an additional hole in your income statement.
你所要做的就是减少投资。你要么完全不投资，要么只偶尔小额投资，但你必须非常有信心，能够成功地将资金放入市场，不会在你的收益表上再次造成损失。
Again, fund flows on the broadly syndicated side are not strong enough to give the confidence to the banks to continue to support that market. Now I think that that overhang remains true for considerable period of time. Why? Because broadly syndicated loans that were originated over the last three, four or five years were put in place during easy money times, which means that the capital structures are imbalanced under the current rate environment, which means that we should expect to see elevated defaults and losses in the broadly syndicated loan opportunity set or the existing loans that are out there trading in the secondary market in 2023 and 2024, which then further means that there's going to be weaker fund formation to buy loans, just given the backdrop on the fundamental side causing hesitation in that investor base.
再次强调，大规模银行贷款市场的资金流动不够强大，不能给银行带来足够的信心来继续支持该市场。我认为这种不确定性将持续相当长的一段时间。为什么？因为在过去的三年、四年或五年中产生的大规模银行贷款是在易钱时期出现的，这意味着当前的利率环境下，资本结构不平衡，因此我们应该预计在2023年和2024年，广泛的银行贷款机会集或者在二级市场交易的现有贷款将面临较高的违约和损失，这进一步意味着在投资者基础中引起犹豫的基本面背景下，购买贷款的基金形成将会更加薄弱。
So it's a pretty durable opportunity set, I think, on the direct lending side to step in where the banks will have challenges to use their balance sheet to commit to new deals given the instability in the end buyer set of broadly syndicated loans.
我认为，在直接贷款方面，这是一个相当持久的机会，因为银行在面对广泛贷款的最终购买者不稳定时会遇到使用平衡表承诺新交易的挑战。
Next question is for both of you. Why do you think that competition to fill this funding gap among direct lenders may be somewhat limited? I'm happy to give my view.
下一个问题是针对你们两个的。你们认为为什么直接贷款人之间填补资金缺口的竞争可能会有些有限？我愿意提出我的看法。
I think that in the current uncertain economic backdrop, only the largest, only the most well-balanced credit platforms will be able to separate out the good opportunities from the negative ones. I think they will be able to grow and they will be able to attract capital because of their framework, because of the balance in their credit platforms, the history to have invested through multiple cycles.
我认为在当前不确定的经济背景下，只有最大的，最平衡的信贷平台才能区分好的机会和消极的机会。我认为他们将能够成长并吸引资本，因为他们的框架，因为他们信贷平台的平衡性，以及在多个周期中的投资历史。
And that isn't everybody. That isn't everybody in direct lending and that certainly isn't everybody in credit. So I think a small number of well-healed, well-balanced long-term credit investors will grow and invest responsibly. And I think that investors in terms of institutional investors will go with those managers rather than pro-cyclical-minded investment managers that have only invested during benign market times.
这并不是所有人的情况。这不是直接贷款中的每个人，当然也不是信贷领域的所有人。因此，我认为只有一小部分财力雄厚、平衡稳健、长期投资的信贷投资人会增加并负责地投资。我认为在机构投资者方面，投资者们会选择这些管理人而不是那些在良性市场时期才进行投资的周期性投资者。
That's why I think the competitive set will remain attractive and balanced for the likes of those investors that are large and have the ability or have the history of having invested through multiple cycles.
因此，我认为对于那些规模较大并具有能力或历史经验能够在多个周期内投资的投资者来说，竞争环境将保持具有吸引力和平衡的状态。
I mean, obviously, he doesn't want to say like oak tree. But the truth of the matter is, Anna, the private lending industry has only looked like it does today. Over the last, let's say, 12 years.
我的意思是，显然他不想说像橡树一样的话。但事实是，安娜，私人贷款行业只是在过去大约12年中看起来像今天这样。
My feeling is that it was around 2011 that the current version of private lending was invented because the banks left a void after the global financial crisis. And the market sector grew rapidly. The existing funds got a lot bigger and a lot of new funds joined the fray.
我的感觉是，私人借贷的当前版本是在2011年左右被发明的，因为全球金融危机后银行留下了一个空缺。市场部门迅速增长。现有基金的规模变得更大，许多新基金加入了竞争。
Some of them, as Armid says, big, professionalized, disciplined, thorough, some of them eager, aggressive, looking for assets under management and higher fees. The point is, if you invested so fast over this period, so voraciously, that you couldn't do thorough due diligence, you may be looking at problems in your portfolio today.
正如阿米德所说，其中一些理财机构大型、专业化、纪律严明、认真细致，而另一些则渴望积累资产和更高的管理费。重点是，如果你在这段时间内投资得太快、太贪婪，无法进行彻底的尽职调查，可能会在今天面临投资组合中的问题。
So number one, you may have to spend your time on your problems, not the new opportunities. Number two, you may have to reserve capital for solving your problems. The main way you solve credit problems is by injecting more equity capital. Number three, your record may not look so good, so maybe you can't attract new capital. And so your activity is kind of stagnate.
首先，你可能需要花时间来处理你的问题，而不是寻找新机会。其次，你可能需要保留资金来解决问题。解决信用问题的主要方式是注入更多的股权资本。第三，你的记录可能不太好，所以可能无法吸引新的资金。因此，你的活动可能会停滞不前。
Warren Buffett said, I think it was in early on, for the first time, that it's only when the tide goes out that you find out who's been swimming naked. The tide didn't go out between 2011 and 2022. It only began to go out in 2022. We think it's in the process of going out. So some managers will be exposed. Their activities may be curtailed, leading to reduced competition among lenders, which all things being equal back to the beginning, leads to higher demanded yields and higher demanded safety.
沃伦·巴菲特曾经说过，在早期，第一次看到潮水退去，你才会知道谁在裸泳。2011年到2022年间，潮水并没有退去，直到2022年才开始出现退潮。我们认为目前潮水正在退去中。因此，一些管理者将被揭露出来。他们的活动可能会受到限制，导致贷款人之间的竞争减少，而在所有事情相等的情况下，这将导致更高的需求收益和更高的需求安全性。
What do you think might be some of the longer term implications for direct lending as a whole as a result of some of the changes we're seeing now? I think that if there are managers who weren't disciplined and who didn't do a great job of limiting their risk in the halcyon days, they'll get weeded out. And our Darwinian process will lead to the professionalization of the sector.
您认为由于我们现在看到的一些变化，直接放贷可能会有哪些长期影响？我认为，如果有些经理在繁荣时期没有受过纪律训练并且没有很好地限制风险，他们将会被淘汰。我们的达尔文进化过程将导致该行业的专业化。
And hopefully, if Armin and I are right about what lies ahead in the next couple of years, hopefully in the next cycle, when there's behave better with more discipline, the bad loans they make in the good periods aren't as bad and the sector is improved. What do you think, Armin? Yeah, completely agree. And I would say that the direct lending market will likely grow at even a faster clip because of the gap, the void in the market, I do think that the largest and best well diversified firms will be the beneficiary of that growth and the smaller ones or the more risk tolerant ones will be the ones that no longer have a business.
希望如果Armin和我对接下来几年发展的判断是正确的话，希望下一个周期中，当银行采取更好的行为和更严格的纪律，他们在好时期开出的坏贷款不会那么糟糕，该行业也将得到改善。你怎么看，Armin？是的，我完全同意。我认为直接放贷市场很可能会以更快的速度增长，因为市场上存在缺口，最大和最好的多元化公司将受益于这种增长，而规模较小或更具风险承受能力的公司将不再具备业务。
Just to put some numbers around it, before the global financial crisis, the direct lending market was about $250 billion in total. And today it's approaching one and a half trillion. That's pretty significant growth, but I do think that that growth is not done. And the direct lending market is on pace to overshadow the size of the high-yield bond market and the broadly syndicated loan market, each of which are right now about one and a half trillion dollars. So it's the continued growth of a very large asset class. I think the beneficiaries are, again, the biggest and best and most conservative, balanced investment managers.
为了简述一下，全球金融危机前，直接贷款市场总额约为2500亿美元。而今天它已接近1.5万亿美元。这是相当显著的增长，但我认为这种增长还没结束。直接贷款市场正以超过高收益债券市场和广泛发行贷款市场的规模增长，当前这两者大约各为1.5万亿美元。因此，它是一个非常庞大的资产类别持续增长。我认为，再次从中受益的是最大、最好、最保守、最平衡的投资经理们。
As a result of that growth, I think the other outcome will be that there will be some step out strategies that relate back to direct lending as a core asset class, including credit secondaries, including specialty funds or other sector-specific funds, asset-based lending, etc., or regional-focused funds. So there's going to be an evolution just within private credit with a little bit more detailed opportunities or specific targeted opportunities within the broad umbrella of direct lending or private credit.
由于这种增长，我认为另一个结果将是出现一些与直接放贷作为核心资产类别相关的退出策略，包括信贷二手市场、专业基金或其他特定行业基金、资产抵押贷款等，或者区域性基金。因此，在私募信贷领域内，将会出现更具细节的机会或具有特定目标的机会，这些机会将在直接放贷或私募信贷的广泛范围内展现出来。
So now let's broaden out a bit to talk about opportunities and risks across asset classes. Earlier Howard and Armin, you both mentioned this potential for a distressed opportunity. So I'd like you to both speak more about that. I think one of the implications of the easy money environment is that it was harder to go bankrupt or to default in that climate.
现在，让我们更广泛地谈谈跨资产类别的机遇和风险。Howard和Armin早些时候都提到了可能出现的困境机会。所以我想请你们两位更多地谈论这个问题。我认为，轻松获得资金的环境的一个影响是，在这种气候下，破产或违约变得更加困难。
When the economy is doing well, the markets are doing well, people are optimistic, capital providers are generous, interest rates are low, it's hard to default. It's hard to go bankrupt. If you lose a bunch of money, you can borrow more. One of the whole marks of the last 15 or so years is that it became easy for companies that lose money continually to borrow more. 30 years ago, 50 years ago when I started, you couldn't do that. I mean, losing companies couldn't keep borrowing money, but they did over this period.
当经济状况良好、市场稳定，人们充满乐观情绪，资本供应充足且利息率低时，遇到破产难度较大。如果你亏损很多，可以借更多的钱。过去15年左右的时间里，其中一个显著特点是，继续亏钱的企业很容易贷款。而在30年前、50年前，当我开始工作时，情况是不同的。我意思是，亏损的公司不能持续借贷，但在此期间他们却一直做到了。
And as a consequence, the default rate, for example, on the high-yobahn universe was unusually low. I started the city's bond in 1978, which I think was the first high-yobahn fund from a mainstream financial institution. And over the next 30 years, from 78 to 08, I think the average default rate on high-yobons in the universe, not for us, but in the universe was just over 4%. We considered that normal. Now that meant one or two, most years, and then 10 or 12 in the crises averaged out to four.
因此，例如在高收益债券领域，违约率异常地低。我于1978年开始为该市发行债券，我认为那是来自主流金融机构的第一个高收益债券基金。在接下来的30年中，从1978年到2008年，我认为高收益债券领域的平均违约率，不是我们的，而是全球的平均违约率只有略微超过4％。我们认为这是正常的。这意味着每年有一两个，然后在危机期间平均为10或12个，总体平均值为四个。
In the period 2010 through 2019, I think that the average was closer to two. As I recall, there was only one year at four. So the previous average was not the average for this more recent period. Why? Easy money. And if that's not the case going forward, Arthesis, Armin and I and Rest of Updury, Arthesis, that doesn't describe the New York term future. So we think we'll see more defaults and pregnancies. Yeah.
在2010年至2019年的时期中，我认为平均值更接近于两。我记得只有一年是四。所以之前的平均值不是这个更近期的时期的平均值。为什么呢？是因为货币宽松政策。如果未来不是这种情况，Arthesis、Armin和我以及Updury的其余人认为这并不是纽约未来的描述。因此我们认为会看到更多的违约和怀孕。是的。
Now, I would add that it's going to be more acute with borrowers that again have a mismatch in their assets and liabilities. So borrowers that have floating rate liabilities are experiencing the real-time impact of base rates rising so rapidly. As opposed to fixed rate borrowers that have the benefit of time, in the case of investment grade bonds several years, in the case of high-yobons, no fair number of years as well, where they have a fixed cost of borrowing and the benefit of time to get through a volatile economic patch.
现在我想补充的是，如果借款人的资产和负债再次不匹配，情况会变得更加紧急。因此，那些拥有浮动利率负债的借款人正在实时感受到基准利率急剧上涨的影响。相反，固定利率借款人在投资级债券的情况下，可以有几年的时间来获得好处，在高收益债券的情况下，可以有许多年的时间来获得固定借款成本的好处，并获得度过经济波动的时间优势。
It's hard to say how long that volatile economic patch will last. Maybe it's not enough time, but it's certainly more time than a borrower of a floating rate liability. And so I think that the defaults will be more acute on the floating rate side and the losses will probably be deeper than what we have seen historically in those asset classes. In the broadly syndicated loan product, typically we saw about a 25 to 30% loss given default. I think this time around, it's easily far in excess of that because the leverage levels are meaningfully higher today than they were historically. The starting leverage points were five, five and a half times, six times total debt to EBITDA. And that's only escalated and the cost of that debt has gotten more odorous. So it's going to be a challenging time, especially in that asset class.
说出这不稳定的经济状况会持续多久是很难的。也许这需要的时间不足，但肯定比浮动利率负债的借款人需要更长时间。因此，我认为浮动利率负债的违约情况会更加严重，损失可能会比历史上这些资产类别所看到的更深。在广泛的银团贷款产品中，通常我们看到大约25%至30%的违约损失。我认为这一次，由于杠杆水平比历史上高得多，很容易超过这个范围。初始杠杆点是总负债与EBITDA的比率为5、5.5或6。而这只会升高，而且债务的成本会变得更加令人不适。因此，在这个资产类别中，这将是一个具有挑战性的时期。
But the rate picture volatility or rates may create a buying opportunity in fixed rate instruments because to the extent that their value drops more because of technicals and fund flows rather than fundamentals. It creates an opportunity to buy or to rotate a portfolio from a, let's say, broadly syndicated, heavy loan portfolio over to a fixed rate portfolio. As long as you are uptearing in quality, uptearing in the size of borrowers, reducing the leverage of those borrowers, which happens to be the case that both investment grade fixed rate bonds and fixed rate high yield bonds are less levered on average than broadly syndicated loan borrowers through the first lien there.
但是利率波动或波动率可能会在固定利率工具中创造购买机会，因为它们的价值下降更多是由于技术和资金流动性，而不是基本面的原因。这创造了一个机会，可以购买或从广泛的贷款组合中旋转一个组合到固定利率投资组合。只要您在提高质量、提高借款人规模、减少这些借款人的杠杆比率方面做得越来越好，这在投资级固定利率债券和固定利率高收益债券上都是这样的情况，它们的平均杠杆比率都比广泛的贷款借款人低。
And you know what's interesting and just illustrating the complexity of making investment decisions and the fact that what's obvious is often wrong. If you went back, let's say, two and a half years to late 2020 or let's say early 2021 and you started to see in 2020, there was worry about inflation because the environment was being flooded with cash. And then of course in early 2021, inflation started to rise. The knee jerk reaction was, well, the thing you should do is you should buy floating rate debt because the people who own fixed rate debt, it'll be marked down in price floating rate will hold. But as Armin points out, that's fine for the debt, but what about the issuer? The issuers of floating rate debt who are obligated to pay more and more and more interest as rates rise, they got into some trouble. Their income statement took a hit from the cost of interest and some of them will turn out not to have been a great idea. So simplistic answers are rarely availing in the investment world.
你知道什么很有趣，也说明了投资决策的复杂性以及显而易见往往是错误的事实。如果回溯到两年半前，也就是2020年末或2021年初，你会发现2020年存在通货膨胀担忧，因为环境中涌入了大量现金。随后在2021年初，通货膨胀开始上升，人们的第一反应是应该买入浮动利率债券，因为持有固定利率债券的人会被定价调低，而浮动利率债券则可以保持。但正如阿明所指出的那样，对于债券来说这没什么问题，但发行人怎么办呢？持有浮动利率债券的发行人在利率上升时必须支付越来越多的利息，他们会遇到一些麻烦。他们的利润表因支付利息成本而遭受打击，而其中的一些可能不是一个好主意。所以，在投资领域中，简单的答案很少能解决问题。
Would you say that there are any underappreciated risks in the market right now? So things that you don't think people are talking or thinking enough about? Well, I'll just volunteer one. We published the memo C-change. I think it was December 8. It's my sense that most people have not explicitly agreed that in the coming years, as Oak Tree believes, we're not going to see interest rates close to zero. That is the Fed fund rate. We're not going to see steadily declining interest rates. We're not going to see such easy money. We're not going to see such unbridled growth in the economy and in markets. We're not going to see the same low level of defaults. We're not going to see the same ease in obtaining financing. That's the C-change that the memo talked about. We believe that these impacts still lie ahead. And I don't think that the investment world has embraced that view. Everybody says, oh, yeah, sure. I know that's possible. But I just don't think that there has been a coalescing of opinion around that idea, which is fine. We'd rather be the only people to hold that opinion assuming we turn out to be right.
你认为目前市场上有没有被低估的风险？ 一些人们没有充分讨论或思考的事情？ 好的，我只是自愿提供一个。我们在12月8日发布了备忘录“C-change”。我认为大多数人还没有明确同意，在未来几年中，与橡树公司的看法相同，我们将不会看到利率接近零。那是联邦基金利率。我们将不会看到利率稳定下降。我们将不会看到如此容易的资金。我们将不会看到经济和市场的不受限制的增长。我们将不会看到相同低的拖欠水平。我们将不会看到获得融资的相同简易程度。这是备忘录所讲述的“C-change”。我们相信这些影响仍然在未来。我认为投资界尚未接受这种观点。每个人都说，“哦，是啊，我知道可能会发生。”但我只是认为没有对这个想法达成共识，这是可以的。假设我们是正确的，我们宁愿是唯一持有该观点的人。
Yes, I was going to say something similar, which is I think for the rate of inflation to decline to two or three percent from current levels, you would need to see a real continued degradation of the economy to the point where certain, very important institutions in the economy break down in a shocking way, break down.
是的，我原本也想说类似的话，我认为如果通货膨胀率要从当前水平下降到两三个百分点，你需要看到经济的持续恶化，以至于某些非常重要的经济机构以令人震惊的方式崩溃。
I don't think the Fed necessarily wants that. They do want to see two to three percent inflation, but I don't think they want to see massive foreclosures and losses and big, huge bubbles bursting in light of the economy being relatively okay, but for the cost of borrowing so high. I think what ends up happening is that the Fed funds rate made decline from current levels, but not go back down to anywhere near where they were four or five years ago, which kind of gives you this higher for longer rate picture.
我认为美联储并不一定想要发生那种情况。他们确实希望看到2-3%的通货膨胀，但我不认为他们希望看到大规模的抵押不良和损失，以及在经济相对良好但借款成本很高的情况下发生巨大的泡沫破裂。我认为最终会发生的情况是，联邦基金利率可能会从当前水平下降，但不会回落到四五年前的任何接近水平，这也意味着你可能会看到更长时间的较高利率状况。
And therefore, support of the sea change comments and memo from Howard, where we're just going to have higher rates, meaningfully higher rates over the next few years than we saw previously. And there will be some bubbles bursting and some asset classes resetting their values because of this higher rate environment, and as long as it isn't a massive destruction, I think the Fed lets it happen.
因此，支持霍华德对海洋变化评论和备忘录的看法。在未来几年中，我们将看到比以前显著更高的利率，因此一些泡沫将破裂，某些资产类别的价值将重新调整。只要这不造成巨大破坏，我认为美联储会让其发生。
The other thing I would point out about this higher for longer issue around rates, I think the one topic that there isn't enough time or enough attention being paid is around the debt ceiling. I know we talk about the debt ceiling and it's more of a political issue in the United States where the government going to shut down what's going to happen with jobs, what's going to happen with the people that work for the government.
关于利率持续上涨的问题，我想指出的另一件事情是，我们没有足够的时间或足够的关注度来讨论债务上限。我知道我们谈论债务上限，这更多是美国的政治问题，政府关闭后会发生什么，工作会发生什么变化，政府雇员将会面临什么问题。
But there's actually a markets issue that underlies the debt ceiling that it is going to become, I think, a very large problem. And what is that? Is that the treasury for now has been using the general account to fund itself and not pushing out bonds or not selling bonds across the yield curve, specifically not selling long-term bonds. It has been okay with selling short-term treasuries because money markets are a natural buyer for that, but they don't seem to want to test the long-term market or the depth of it.
实际上，债务上限存在一个市场问题，将成为一个非常大的问题。这个问题是什么呢？就是财政部目前一直使用一般账户来融资，而没有发行债券或者在收益曲线上出售债券，特别是没有出售长期债券。它只愿意出售短期国库券，因为货币市场是天然的买家，但是它似乎不想测试长期市场或者市场的深度。
But when the debt ceiling is raised, which we expected to be raised because of the political issues with not raising it, there is likely to be going to be a very large issuance of US treasury bonds across the yield curve. And the absorption of those bonds may be challenging, which will probably mean a step change up in the yield curve. So it might not even be that we even see a decline in rates in the near term. We actually might see it go up from here. I don't think that the markets are prepared for that type of issue. I think another shock and another blow to certain interest rate-sensitive asset classes.
但当债务上限被提高时，由于政治问题不提高是不可行的，我们预计会发生大规模的美国国债发行。这些国债的吸收可能会有挑战性，这可能意味着收益曲线上的一个大幅度提高。因此，即使在短期内我们可能不会看到利率下降，实际上可能会出现上升的情况。我认为市场并没有为这种情况做好准备。我认为这是对某些利率敏感的资产类别的另一次冲击和打击。
So that's something to watch, something we're very mindful of. We have to manage our duration as a result of an expectation that rates could increase because of this debt ceiling consideration. And it adds yet more fuel to the fire on the distress side. There will be, I think, opportunities because of this if there's another step change up in rates.
这是一个需要关注的问题，我们非常注意。由于债务上限的考虑，我们必须管理我们的期限，因为有人预计利率可能会上涨。这在困境方面又增加了更多的火药。如果利率再次出现阶段性变动，我认为就会有机会。
My last question will just be, do either of you have any final thoughts? I think Howard has the last word. So Howard, please go ahead.
我的最后一个问题是，你们俩有没有任何最终的想法？我认为霍华德应该说最后一句话。所以霍华德，请你说吧。
意思是询问对话的两个人是否有任何最终的想法或结论，然后指定一个人来发表最后的评论。
You know, Anna, back in, I think it was maybe July of 07. I published a memo called, It's All Good. We were on the doorstep of the global financial crisis. Yet every market and every country was acting as if there was only good ahead. One of my strongest beliefs, maybe the one I'm sure is to have, is the riskiest thing in the world is the belief that there's no risk. That's the way people felt in early 07. And of course, as I say, we're on the doorstep of the GFC, which was the most serious crisis that I've lived through in financial terms. Then two weeks later, I published one called, It's All Good, Really, With a Question Mark. And then two months later, one called, Now It's All Bad. This is the way things go.
你知道吗，安娜，大概是在2007年7月份，我发布了一份备忘录叫做“一切都好”。那个时候，全球金融危机已经悄然而至，但是所有的市场和国家都认为前方只有好的事情。我最强烈的信念之一，也许是我最确信的，就是认为世界上最危险的事情就是认为没有风险存在。这正是人们在07年初的想法。当然，在我们面临着全球金融危机的门槛上，这是我在金融方面经历过的最严重的危机。两周后，我发布了一篇带问号的备忘录，名为“一切都好，真的吗？”两个月后，又发布了一篇备忘录，名为“现在一切都糟糕”。这就是事情的发展。
I've said in the past that in the real world, things fluctuate between pretty good and not so hot. But in the investment world, psychology goes from flawless to hopeless. Two years ago, I think that the psychology was that the outlook was flawless. And now some flaws have appeared. There has not been capitulation. The stock market has held up pretty well. And we haven't seen many meltdowns outside the few banks. And we haven't seen massive withdrawals from funds, et cetera.
我曾经说过，在现实世界中，事情的波动在相当不错和不太好之间摇摆。但在投资世界，心理状态从无瑕疵到绝望变化巨大。两年前，我认为心理状态是看好的，而现在已经出现了一些不足之处。还没有放弃投资，股票市场表现也相当不错。除了少数几家银行外，我们还没有看到很多金融危机的爆发。我们也没有看到大规模退出基金等。
But if we're right about the things that Armand's been talking about, the things that I mentioned about the step change upward in rates that could lie ahead, I think that people will swing further toward publicness. And that will bring better bargains. And we're eager to have them. We're not always eager to have the financial difficulties that bring them about.
如果我们所说的阿曼德谈论的事情和我提到的有可能出现的利率飙升确实存在，我认为人们会更偏向公开透明，这将带来更优厚的交易。我们渴望获得好的交易，但并不希望因此而遭遇经济困难。
That we assume we have no control over that. What we do have control over is taking advantage of bargains when the difficulties create them. And where I would say pretty eager to do so.
我们假设我们对此没有控制权。我们控制的是在困难时利用便宜的机会。而我会说，我们非常渴望这样做。
Well, thank you both so much for joining me today. This is great. It's always a pleasure. Thanks, Anna.
好的，非常感谢你们两位今天的加入。这很棒。见到你们总是一种享受。谢谢你，安娜。
This podcast expresses the views of the author as of the date indicated and such views are subject to change without notice. Oak tree has no duty or obligation to update the information contained herein. Further, Oak tree makes no representation and it should not be assumed that past investment performance is an indication of future results. Moreover, wherever there is a potential for profit, there is also the possibility of loss.
这个播客表达的观点仅代表作者在指定日期时的意见，这些意见可能会不经通知而改变。橡树公司没有更新此处所含信息的责任或义务。此外，橡树公司不表示过去的投资表现是未来结果的指示。此外，任何有利可图的地方也存在潜在的损失可能性。
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