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In the prior edition of the Performing Credit Quarterly, we cautioned investors to be careful what they wished for. As those pricing and significant near-term interest rate cuts would likely only see this Fed pivot occur if something truly negative happened first.
In mid-march, investors got a preview of how the scenario could play out when the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, rescue of Signature Bank, and hasty takeover of Credit Suisse were accompanied by plummeting treasury yields, widening yield spreads, and falling equity prices.
By quarter-end, the crisis appeared to be averted. Fiers about deposit flight had eased. The European Central Bank and Federal Reserve had both proceeded with their expected interest rate hikes, and most markets had strengthened, but this rally may be somewhat deceptive as it was driven by a flight to quality.
Seven large companies accounted for roughly 90% of the S&P 500 index's return in March, and small cap stocks, which are typically perceived to be riskier, recorded significant losses. Meanwhile, investors flooded into investment-grade bonds and continued to price in multiple interest rate cuts before year-end. This behavior is far more symptomatic of weariness than relief.
Do investors have reason to be concerned? While we can't predict the future, we can examine the past. We know that when an era of easy money comes to an abrupt end, simmering risks typically erupt. And over the last year, we've witnessed one of the fastest interest rate hiking cycles in decades, as well as an attempt to begin reversing the largest program of US dollar creation in history. Thus, we believe SVB's collapse won't be the last major disruption caused by the sudden end of this long period of easy money.
This may benefit bargain hunters because credit analysts that are both skilled and disciplined have historically been well positioned to withstand volatility and take advantage of the tremendous buying opportunities that can emerge when other investors take flight.
A Bumpy Ride Over the last year, we've highlighted the fickle nature of investor's expectations regarding interest rates and the economic outlook. The collapse of SVB on March 10 caused this volatility to reach new heights.
In March 15, the Ice Bank of America move index, which measures volatility in the bond market, reached the highest point since 2008, eclipsing the level reached in early 2020 when COVID-19 was shutting down the global economy.
For context, the yield of the two-year treasury has only recorded net daily moves of more than 20 bips on 46 occasions since January 2000. 15 of those were in 2008 and 10 have already occurred in 2023, and it's only April. We expect this volatility to persist, but not because we're anticipating a 2008 style financial crisis.
SVB was particularly vulnerable to rising interest rates due to its concentrated depositor base and exceptionally poor risk management, while Credit Suisse had long-standing problems. But the banking turmoil remains significant because of the impact it could have on credit conditions and investor psychology.
It's likely that banks, which were curtailing their lending activity before the crisis, will seek to further reduce risk because of the recent stress, as well as weakening economic fundamentals, the potential for further regulatory changes, and legacy issues related to overly aggressive lending in the years before 2022. This would effectively tighten financial conditions, even if the Fed slows the pace of interest rate hikes or pauses them entirely.
Financial conditions actually eased in late 2022 and early 2023 and still remain looser than the long-term historical average, but they've tightened since the SVB failure and remains substantially tighter than they were at the beginning of 2022. Additionally, the risk to small, regional banks may intensify, as individuals and companies worry about the health of smaller banks may continue to seek out larger institutions that are considered safer. Regional US banks are major providers of capital to small businesses and real estate developers, so weakness at regional banks may meaningfully weigh on economic activity, even if it doesn't threaten the health of the global financial system.
To further complicate the situation, the US economy already appears to be weakening, albeit from a fairly robust level. The Atlanta Fed's GDP now-tracker, which incorporates data from the US Census Bureau, the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the Institute for Supply Management, is currently anticipating growth of 2.5% in the first quarter, which is in line with the fourth quarter results, but below the 3.2% recorded in 3Q 2022.
We've also recently seen a series of disappointing economic data reports, including the following. Private payrolls, increased by only 145,000 in March, compared to 261,000 in February. Jobless claims figures have topped 200,000 for 10 consecutive weeks. The number of job openings in February fell below 10 million for the first time in almost two years. The ISM Services Purchasing Managers Index fell to 51.2 in March, from 55.1 in the prior month, partly because of a decline in new orders.
In performing credit quarterly for Q 2022, Bad News Bulls, we noted that investors appeared to believe that when it came to the economy, bad news was good news, because weak economic data made it more likely that the Fed would soon end its interest rate hiking cycle. The panic surrounding the SVB collapse appears to have shaken this belief, and made investors recalibrate their macroeconomic expectations. While we aren't predicting that a severe recession or another banking failure are imminent, we think the events of the past quarter have made it highly likely that market volatility will continue, and thus, that prudent credit investors with available capital will be well positioned.
As our co-chairman, Howard Marx noted in his most recent memo, when investors think things are flawless, optimism rides high, and good buys can be hard to find. But when psychology swings in the direction of hopelessness, it becomes reasonable to believe that bargain hunters and providers of capital will be holding the better cards and will have opportunities for better returns. We consider the meltdown of SVB an early step in that direction.
Credit markets key insights for 2Q 2023. Where are oak tree experts finding potential risks, opportunities, and relative value today? Below are key insights that we believe investors should keep in mind when navigating today's markets.
1. The crisis of confidence in the banking system may expand opportunities in private credit. Marx curtailed their lending significantly in 2022, and are likely to continue doing so following the collapse of SVB as they await potential regulatory changes and scrutinize their own vulnerabilities, including those related to depreciating commercial real estate portfolios. As we noted in a recent op-ed, we believe private credit funds may have significant and potentially long-lasting opportunities to fill the resulting funding gaps, especially those related to large-scale leveraged buyouts. However, private credit funds that have employed substantial leverage may be experiencing their own financing strains in an environment where floating rate debt costs have risen and banks have become more risk-averse. These private lenders may also be facing meaningful challenges in their existing portfolios, if they made aggressive loans before 2022 when yield spreads were much narrower and terms were far more borrower friendly. Ultimately, this will likely benefit those private lenders that A have sufficient scale to provide debt financing for large-scale LBOs, and B aren't facing the types of problems that can result from lack-stue diligence.
2. Dislocated markets are creating attractive opportunities for CLO managers, but manager selection is critical. Over the last two decades, managers of collateralized loan obligations, CLOs, have had few opportunities to purchase significant numbers of single B or double B rated bank loans at meaningful discounts, and these buying windows have typically been short. Today, CLO managers have such an opportunity as the average loan price is near 93 cents on the dollar, and roughly 16% of loans are trading below 90 cents. This means CLO equity investors may be in a position to potentially earn return in both the traditional fashion, that is from the difference between the interest earned on the underlying loan portfolio and the interest paid on the CLO debt tranches, and through capital appreciation, as the discounted prices should move back toward par over time, unless the loans default.
Even though CLO equity is in the first loss position and thus carries the highest risk in the CLO structure, it shouldn't be confused with a company's equity. Bank loans, the underlying collateral of the CLO, get paid back first when companies default. Over over, CLO portfolios are actively managed, so during dislocations, CLO managers can potentially protect the credit quality of their portfolio and generate trading gains that may offset any losses that occur in the underlying assets. Importantly, CLOs offer term financing, meaning that CLOs are, contrary to market myth, never subject to margin calls, redemptions, or forced selling. And most CLOs have a five-year reinvestment period, so managers have time to implement and improve credit quality, generate gains, and reinvest amortizations and prepayments. All of the above help explain why default rates for CLOs have remained low historically, even during periods of market stress, such as the global financial crisis, when loan defaults have increased.
However, as we discuss below, risk has increased in the loan market in the last year, as interest rates have risen, so we believe it's more important than ever for investors to identify CLO managers that A have deep expertise in the loan market and B have historically experienced low default rates in their loan portfolios. Three, default rates in the loan market may increase more than those in the high-yield bond market over the next year, and recovery rates could be lower. We anticipate that over the next year, default rates in U.S. leveraged finance markets will only rise into the mid-single digits, well below the recessionary averages, because of the amount of debt that was refinanced or issued at very low interest rates following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, we expect that downgrades and defaults will increase during this period, particularly for borrowers with high leverage or those in cyclical industries. Importantly, we believe the loan market, which has historically had a lower default rate than the high-yield bond market, will record a higher rate during this cycle.
Leverage in the U.S. loan market has grown in the recent decade, as loans have become the tool of choice for private equity sponsors financing leveraged buyouts. More over relative to high-yield bonds, the loan market has A, an overweight to lower rated securities, that is, single B and below, B, higher borrowing costs, and C, greater exposure to the highly leveraged software technology sector. While we anticipate that recoveries in the high-yield bond market during this cycle will be near the historical average of 40%, we expect recoveries in the loan market to be lower than the 65% long-term average. This is due to the covenant-light nature of most loans and the rising prevalence of loan-only capital structures. Seniority only matters if you're senior to something. However, we believe that recovery rates are likely to vary significantly by industry. As we noted last quarter, we believe we're in a credit picker's market, and that dispersion by sector and issuer is likely to increase moving forward.
The following is an overview of the market conditions and potential risks and opportunities in various asset classes. We use indices as proxies for each asset class. For details about the indices used, please refer to the written piece on the Oak Tree Insights website.
以下是各种资产类别的市场情况、潜在风险和机会概述。我们使用指数作为每个资产类别的代理。有关使用的指数的详细信息,请参阅 Oak Tree Insights 网站上的书面文章。
High-yield bonds, market conditions in 1Q 2023, US high-yield bonds. Fixed rate assets strengthened in 1Q 2023, despite experiencing volatility. High-yield bonds rallied significantly in January as inflation slowed and recession fears declined. The rally cooled in February and the asset class weakened in mid-March following the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank. Prices rose toward quarter-end as fears about the banking system abated. The asset class's full return for 1Q 2023 was 3.7%. High-yield bonds spreads were volatile. While they narrowed by as much as 90 Bips during the quarter, they widened by 130 Bips following the failure of SVB, before contracting by 60 Bips before quarter-end for a modest quarterly net contraction. They ended the quarter toward the high end of the normal range of 300 to 500 Bips. Yields remained elevated. While yields declined by nearly 50 Bips during the period, they remain well above the 10-year average. Approximately 55% of the asset class had yields above 7% at quarter-end compared to less than 7% at the beginning of 2022.
European high-yield bonds. The asset class experienced volatility but ultimately strengthened in 1Q 2023. The asset class generated a 3.4% return in the period. B-rated bonds outperformed while there was a notable rally in some sectors that struggled in 2022, such as consumer goods. The spread premium versus U.S. high-yield bonds shrank further. The European asset class's advantage declined to 70 Bips at quarter-end from a high of 174 Bips in 2022.
Opportunities
The risk of widespread defaults in 2023 remains low. Issuer's fundamentals are fairly healthy despite the slowdown in economic growth and near-term maturities are minimal following the wave of refinancings in 2020-2021. The U.S. default rate over the last 12 months was only 1.3% at quarter-end. Quality in the high-yield bond market has improved. The percentage of double-b-rated bonds in the U.S. market is near a 10-year high while the number of triple-c-rated credits declined during the decade. Thus, the asset class appears to be better positioned to weather an economic downturn than in the past.
Risks
Tight monetary policy could harm heavily indebted companies. Low-rated corporate issuers might struggle to roll over debt now that financial conditions have become more restrictive. High inflation could impair issuers' fundamentals. While inflation has slowed, it remains elevated. Companies may be unable to pass along price increases to customers. Reduce earnings could negatively impact leverage ratios and potentially lead to credit rating downgrades. In-your-lones, market conditions in 1Q-2023.
U.S. senior loans
U.S. senior loan prices rose in 1Q-2023, but markets were volatile. The asset class generated a quarterly return of 3.1%. Performance was supported by increased demand from CLOs and limited new issuance. However, the loan market could weaken moving forward if the economy continues to slow. Retail investors reduced their exposure to the asset class. Lone mutual funds and ETFs recorded 8 consecutive months of outflows through March. Net outflows in 1Q-2023 totaled $9.3 billion. The U.S. broadly syndicated loan market has experienced consistent outflows and weak issuance over the last 3 quarters, resulting in the first decrease in outstanding loans since 2008.
European senior loans
European loans strengthened, especially the lowest credit rating group. The asset class returned 3.6% in the period. While volatility increased in March, the riskiest segment of the market still outperformed during the full period. Triple C rated loans returned 5.7% in the quarter. The spread premium versus U.S. loans has disappeared. Yield spreads of European assets are now narrower than those in the U.S. loan market for the first time since 2Q-2022, largely due to moderating concerns about Europe's economy.
Opportunities
Elevated interest rates may make loans relatively more attractive to investors. The spike in reference rates over the last year could make floating rate loans more compelling than fixed rate assets. Low issuance could support performance. Activity in the primary market is expected to remain limited through 2Q-2023. The performance of existing loans typically benefits when the supply of new loans shrinks. Loans core buyer base is stable. Volatility in loans is usually lower than in other asset classes because A, CLOs, the primary holders, have limited selling pressure and B, the asset class tends to attract long-term institutional investors due to the lengthy cash settlement period.
Risks
Rising interest rates may be especially burdensome to heavily indebted borrowers. Barrowers that didn't hedge their interest rate risk, especially those in highly leveraged sectors like technology, could struggle to service their debt. High inflation could harm companies' fundamentals. While inflation has moderated, it remains elevated. Barrowers may struggle to pass along cost inflation to customers, which could negatively impact companies' earnings and leverage ratios. Economic growth may slow, increasing the likelihood of downgrades and defaults. Downgrades in the U.S. exceeded upgrades by $65 billion in the first quarter. Default risk over the medium term has grown, highlighting the importance of disciplined credit selection. Loan quality has declined in recent years. Issuer-friendly loans may have encouraged improved borrowing, which could prove problematic in an economic downturn. Additionally, loan-only borrowers currently account for almost 60% of the market.
Market conditions in 1Q 2023 EM bond performance was boosted by declining interest rate expectations, but negatively impacted by the global flight to quality. The asset class quarterly return was 2.3%. EM debt generated a return of nearly 4% in January, driven by falling treasury yields, and telefund inflows, and optimism regarding China's reopening. But the asset class started to weaken in February, as high inflation, a worsening growth outlook, and bank stress in developed markets weighed on investors' risk appetite.
EM debt funds experienced outflows near quarter end, and new issuance remains subdued. EM debt funds have recorded modest, year-to-date inflows, as meaningful outflows in March offset much of the strong inflows in January. The sluggish pace of bond issuance in 2022 continued through 1Q 2023. Issuance in the quarter fell to the lowest level since 2016, and high yield issuers have accounted for less than 20% of the activity. Latin America underperformed other EM regions. Latin American debt returned only 0.8% in 1Q 2023.
This was primarily due to stress in the region's largest market, Brazil, where local capital market conditions tightened, a large retailer defaulted, and the number of distressed companies spiked. Additionally, political discontent in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru negatively affected investor sentiment.
Opportunities. Week capital flows and market volatility may create compelling EM price dislocations. Volatility in the US treasury market remains at historically high levels. Recent bank runs continue to be front of mind for investors, and EM bond funds have been facing outflows. In this environment, EM credit may experience broad sell-offs, potentially creating opportunities for investors to purchase the debt of fundamentally sound issuers at dislocated prices. Active management could be beneficial in this challenging environment. Extensive credit analysis may enable investors to identify securities that offer attractive risk-adjusted return potential. Companies that can generate consistent cash flow may be well positioned in an environment where access to US dollar financing is limited.
Risks. Credit investors may underestimate the economic effects of recent monetary policy tightening and the risk of stagflation. Global growth estimates have repeatedly been revised downward, and capital remains scarce for most EM issuers. If the global economy slows, EM countries may disproportionately feel the negative effects, even if the slowdown causes global central banks to pause their policy tightening. Geopolitical tensions in EM remain elevated. The war in Ukraine, Sino-US relations, rising populism in Latin America, and macroeconomic instability in Turkey could all erode investor confidence in EM credit.
The asset class strengthened in 1Q 2023 despite market volatility, generating a return of 2.9%. The rally in the equity and convertibles markets mostly occurred in January, and was primarily driven by A, expectations that inflation may have peaked, B, optimism that the pace of interest rate hikes could slow, and C, China's broad-based economic reopening. Large-cap equities outperformed.
Global equity in credit markets experienced significant volatility following the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank. As a result, large-cap stocks outperformed as investors flock toward assets deemed to be higher quality and thus safer. Primary market activity was healthy in 1Q 2023. New issuance of convertibles globally totalled $19.7 billion across 39 new deals during the period, well above last year's sluggish pace, and in line with the pre-pandemic average volume.
Opportunities The convertibles universe is broad and diverse. Many of the new deals in 2023 have come from historically underrepresented convertible bond sectors such as energy, materials, and utilities, investment-grade rated issuers, and large-cap companies. The terms of these new securities have become increasingly investor-friendly. On a trailing 12-month basis, the average coupon for a new global convertible is 3.7%, compared to the low of 1.4% in 2021. Issuers may increasingly turn to the convertible bond market in the coming year. Since the global financial crisis, issuance of high-yield bonds has dramatically outpaced activity in the convertibles market. However, higher borrowing costs in the traditional bond market may now encourage issuers to turn to convertibles. As more borrowers migrate toward this market, the quality of new issuance should improve, potentially enhancing the average risk return profile in convertibles.
Risks Numerous trends threaten to slow global economic growth and weigh-on equity prices. These include lack of confidence in the banking sector, tightening credit conditions, negative consumer sentiment, high inflation, hawkish monetary policy in developed markets, and elevated geopolitical risk.
Corporate Broad market volatility negatively impacted the CLO market. The asset class weakened in March as investors' risk appetite declined following the collapse of Silicon Valley bank. However, for the full quarter, double-be rated CLOs and triple-be rated CLOs generated returns of 3.6% and 2.3% respectively.
Primary market activity remained muted. Issuance of collateralized loan obligations in the US totaled $33.9 billion in the period compared to $51.3 billion in 1Q 2022. Issuance in Europe totaled only $6.3 billion during the quarter versus $15.4 billion in 1Q 2022.
Primary market activity has continued to slow. Issuance of commercial mortgage-backed securities in the first quarter totaled $6.3 billion compared to $44 billion in 1Q 2022. Issuance in the period represents the lowest first quarter total since 1Q 2012.
Yield spreads have continued to widen. Commercial and residential real estate-backed securities continue to face many headwinds, including rising interest rates, higher cap rates, declining transaction volumes, falling asset values, and reduced bank lending. In addition, the asset class is grappling with potential fundamental shifts in demand in certain sectors, such as office. Triple-be rated commercial mortgage-backed securities generated a return of negative 5.4% during the period.
Double-be rated CLO debt tranches have many sources of potential value. They have attractive structural and credit enhancements, as well as low sensitivity to interest rate increases.
Structured credit continues to offer higher average yields than traditional credit asset classes. Weakness in the CLO market could create attractive buying opportunities. Volatile markets could create compelling opportunities for CLO managers. They can potentially buy single-be or double-be rated loans at significant discounts.
Weakness in real estate-backed securities could create compelling opportunities for disciplined investors. We think firms with available capital and limited problems in their existing portfolios will be well positioned to take advantage of these opportunities. But in this challenging environment, it will be especially important to A, maintain disciplined credit analysis, and B, remain senior in the capital structure.
CLOs have historically performed poorly during bouts of equity market weakness. Performance could continue to be negatively affected by anxieties about the economic outlook and the health of the loan market. Primary market activity in real estate-backed securities may remain limited due to widening yield spreads. Uncertainty surrounding the trajectories for interest rates and inflation, as well as concerns about the health of the banking system, will likely limit transaction volumes in the near term.
The volume and quality of sponsor backdeals varies considerably by size. In 2022, yield spreads for large-cap LBO financings, that is, ebit a greater than or equal to $50 million, increased by 100 to 150 bips, leverage levels fell, and sponsors equity percentages increased, lowering LTV ratios.
While private equity dry powder is at an all-time high, the syndicated loan market has slowed significantly. Banks, which have traditionally provided most of the debt financing for large-cap deals, continue to decrease their lending activities. Many established, large-private lending funds have also reduced loan sizes on average, potentially due to concerns about slowing economic growth, sluggish fundraising, and existing portfolio issues.
Private deal volume in Europe declined as markets faced many headwinds. The region continues to be beset by high inflation, economic uncertainty, and geopolitical risk. Deals are taking longer to complete, as eroding macroeconomic conditions are extending due diligence timelines. Small banks, which underwrite a significant proportion of deals in Europe, may curtail their lending, following the recent turmoil in the banking system.
Private lenders could continue to gain market share in large-cap financings. Banks may not be in a position to consistently provide funding in this market for a significant period of time. In 2022, many banks suffered meaningful losses on LBO debt commitments. High borrowing costs and slowing economic activity may weaken their loan portfolios, and recent bank failures may reduce risk appetite and result in stricter regulatory scrutiny. Also, the syndicated market has become less reliable.
In 2023, CLO formation has been uneven, and retail funds have experienced meaningful outflows. Rescue lending opportunities are likely to grow, the opportunities that could expand especially if the recent stress in the banking system leads to further credit tightening and weaker economic activity.
Companies in the non-sponsored market remain attractive. Yield spreads in the non-sponsored market widened by as much as 200 Bips in 2022. More than the 100-150 Bips observed in the sponsor backed market. European banks may continue to lose market share to private lenders. We anticipate that the shift toward private financing will continue over the long term. Particularly, now that regulators are likely to monitor regional banks more closely.
Risks US recession risk is increasing. The labor market appears to be weakening. If the US economy contracts, private equity sponsors may not inject capital into struggling companies as they did in 2020 to 2021. Credit fundamentals in several sectors are deteriorating. Consumer facing companies are especially vulnerable, as it has become challenging to pass through price increases to customers. Capital industries may experience significant margin erosion and concerns continue to grow about commercial real estate valuations. Tight monetary policy could negatively impact the lending environment. Higher interest rates may discourage new borrowing and make it challenging for current borrowers to roll over their debt. This situation could make defaults more likely.
Investment grade credit. Market conditions in 1Q 2023. The asset class strengthened in 1Q 2023, generating a return of 2.8%, largely due to slowing inflation and optimism that the Federal Reserve's interest rate hiking cycle is coming to a close. US Treasury yields declined during the period. While the Fed continued to increase interest rates, these hikes were well telegraphed, and Fed Chair Jay Powell also indicated that the pace of tightening may slow. Yield spreads widened during the period. Fears of a looming recession exacerbated by the stress in the banking sector caused modest spread widening. The average yield spread in US investment grade credit increased slightly, ending the quarter at 138 Bips. Higher quality credits have been resilient. Fundamentals in the investment grade corporate bond market remain strong, despite the economic headwinds. At quarter end, the A-rated segment of the corporate bond index returned 3.3% with a yield to maturity of roughly 5%.
Opportunities. Investment grade corporate debt yields have remained elevated in 2023. While yields declined slightly during the quarter by roughly 30 Bips, yields in the asset class ended the quarter at 4.4%, well above the five-year average. Lending recession risk may make investment grade debt attractive on a relative basis. Investment grade debt is likely to outperform high-yield bonds if widening yield spreads, as opposed to rising treasury yields, proved to be the primary driver of performance in credit markets in 2023 and 2024. Defensive sectors could potentially offer compelling value if the economy deteriorates. Sector such as consumer staples typically outperform more growth-oriented sectors during economic downturns.
Risks. Inflation may remain well above the 2% target, putting pressure on the Fed to keep interest rates elevated. Tight monetary policy and slowing economic activity will likely continue to temper inflation, but uncertainty remains about how quickly price increases will slow. High input costs and slowing economic growth could weigh on corporate earnings. First fundamentals remain fairly robust on average, but margin compression could negatively impact credit metrics and lead to credit rating downgrades and mark-to-market weakness.
About OakTree's Performing Credit Platform OakTree Capital Management is a leading global alternative investment management firm with expertise in credit strategies. For Performing Credit Platform, encompasses a broad array of credit strategy groups that invest in public and private corporate credit instruments across the liquidity spectrum. The Performing Credit Platform, headed by Armin Pinocion, has $65.1 billion in AUM and approximately 190 investment professionals.
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