好的，这是内容的中文翻译： Acquired 第 14 集重点讨论了微软以 262 亿美元收购 LinkedIn 的事件。主持人 Ben Gilbert 和 David Rosenthal 讨论了 LinkedIn 的历史，分析了收购背后的理由，并推测了其潜在的影响。 LinkedIn 由包括 Reid Hoffman 在内的前 PayPal 员工于 2002 年创立，于 2003 年 5 月推出。它通过“抓取”地址簿和向联系人发送垃圾邮件迅速发展。 这种激进的策略导致了一场诉讼，但证明了在启动网络方面是有效的。 2003 年末，红杉资本领投了他们的 A 轮融资。红杉资本在 LinkedIn 的整个上市公司生涯中都保持着董事会席位。 2004 年，他们筹集了 B 轮融资。B 轮融资的路演材料强调 LinkedIn 作为关于专业人士的公正事实来源，解决了传统目录中存在的激励问题。 LinkedIn 有三个主要收入来源：人才解决方案（招聘人员访问权限）、营销解决方案（广告）和高级订阅（访问更广泛的网络）。 人才解决方案是主要的收入驱动力，招聘人员为访问该平台支付大量费用。 该公司于 2011 年 5 月上市，发行价为每股 45 美元，首日收盘价为 94.25 美元。 2016 年 2 月，该公司向华尔街宣布了令人失望的业绩指引，其股价暴跌，随之而来的是许多其他 SaaS 股票的财富。 这为微软收购该公司提供了一个窗口，这也是微软一直想用自己的方式做的事情。 Ben 和 David 将此次收购归类为“产品收购”，具有改变微软业务流程的潜力。 他们认为微软需要更好地获取身份信息和更好的数据来丰富他们的其他产品，并全面了解个人的技能、职业历史和身份。 主持人确定了收购的几个战略原因。 首先，将 LinkedIn 与 Office 365 集成可以将微软的身份管理扩展到公司边界之外，这在一个员工频繁更换工作的世界中尤其有价值。 其次，将 LinkedIn 的数据与 Dynamics CRM 集成可以全面了解潜在客户，从而改善销售和营销工作。 他们还指出，LinkedIn 在股价下跌后“打折出售”，使其成为一个有吸引力的目标。 此外，微软可能认为此次收购是一种竞争的必要手段，以防止像 Salesforce 这样的其他公司收购 LinkedIn 并进一步侵占微软的企业领域。 通过收购 LinkedIn，微软捍卫了其作为企业生产力和业务工具提供商的地位。 然而，微软最近在整合收购方面表现不佳，这确实给执行带来了一些风险。 讨论转向了网络效应的力量以及 LinkedIn 在专业社交领域的主导地位。 尽管 LinkedIn 的产品质量经常受到批评，但其庞大的网络和高昂的转换成本使其几乎无法被其他公司超越。 Ben 和 David 认为，颠覆 LinkedIn 的唯一方法是垂直攻击，并使该服务对特定客户群更具价值。 主持人讨论了微软此次收购的债务融资，原因在于其现金持有主要在海外，如果汇回国内将产生大量税收。 主持人还讨论了巨额的股票期权补偿，这会稀释 LinkedIn 的股价，但现在这是微软的问题了。 由于整合两家公司涉及巨大的执行风险，Ben 将此次收购评为“A-”。 David 将其评为“A”，并指出其相对于峰值估值的价值及其对微软云服务战略的潜在战略影响。 他们都认可未来巨大的机遇，只要微软能够成功执行。

Acquired episode 14 focuses on Microsoft's acquisition of LinkedIn for $26.2 billion. Hosts Ben Gilbert and David Rosenthal discuss the history of LinkedIn, analyze the rationale behind the acquisition, and speculate on its potential impact. LinkedIn was founded in 2002 by former PayPal employees, including Reid Hoffman, launching in May 2003. It quickly grew by "scraping" address books and spamming contacts. This aggressive tactic resulted in a lawsuit but proved effective in bootstrapping the network. In late 2003, Sequoia Capital led their series A. Sequoia would maintain a board seat for LinkedIn for its entire public life. In 2004 they raised their series B. The series B pitch deck emphasized LinkedIn as an unbiased source of truth about professionals, solving incentive problems that existed in traditional directories. LinkedIn has three primary revenue streams: Talent Solutions (recruiter access), Marketing Solutions (ads), and Premium Subscriptions (access to broader networks). Talent Solutions is the dominant revenue driver, with recruiters paying significant amounts for access to the platform. The company went public in May 2011, pricing at $45 per share and closing its first day of trading at $94.25. In February 2016, the company announced disappointing guidance to Wall Street, its stock plummeted and with it, the fortunes of numerous other SaaS stocks. This provided a window for Microsoft to acquire the company, something Microsoft's been wanting to do in their own way. Ben and David categorize the acquisition as a "product acquisition" with the potential to transform Microsoft's business processes. They think Microsoft needs to have better access to identity and better data to enrich their other product offerings, with a holistic view of an individual's skills, career history, and identity. The hosts identify several strategic reasons for the acquisition. First, integrating LinkedIn with Office 365 extends Microsoft's identity management beyond company boundaries and is particularly valuable in a world where employees frequently change jobs. Second, integrating LinkedIn's data with Dynamics CRM provides a comprehensive view of potential customers, improving sales and marketing efforts. They also note that LinkedIn was "on sale" after its stock decline, making it an attractive target. Additionally, Microsoft likely saw the acquisition as a competitive necessity, preventing other companies like Salesforce from acquiring LinkedIn and further encroaching on Microsoft's enterprise territory. By acquiring LinkedIn, Microsoft defends its position as the provider of productivity and business tools for enterprises. Microsoft’s recent history of not doing particularly well with integrating acquisitions, though, does leave some execution risk on the table here. The discussion shifts to the power of network effects and LinkedIn's dominance in the professional networking space. While LinkedIn's product quality is often criticized, its vast network and high switching costs make it virtually unassailable by other companies. Ben and David suggest the only way to disrupt LinkedIn is by attacking it vertically, and by making that service more valuable for a specific customer base. The hosts discuss Microsoft's debt financing of the acquisition due to its cash holdings being primarily overseas, which would incur substantial taxes if repatriated. The hosts also discuss the enormous amounts of stock based compensation, which would dilute Linkedin's share price, but that that is now Microsoft's problem. Ben grades the acquisition as an "A-" due to the significant execution risk involved in integrating the two companies. David grades it as an "A", noting its value relative to its peak valuation and its potential strategic impact on Microsoft's cloud services strategy. They both agree on the huge opportunities ahead, as long as Microsoft can execute on it.